

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 EA-11 NEA-10 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 NIC-01 DRC-01

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R 071538Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4464

INFO CINCPAC

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD BY POUCH

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 15300

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PBOR CH UR KN XB

SUBJ: KAPITSA ON CHINA, KOREA, ASIAN SECURITY

1. SUMMARY: DURING MY CALL DECEMBER 7, CHIEF OF
MFA FIRST FAR EAST DIVISION (CHINA, KOREA, MONGOLIA)
KAPITSA SAID CHINESE WISH BORDER NEGOTIATIONS TO
CONTINUE BUT DO NOT WANT A SETTLEMENT. ON KOREA,
HE EPXRESSED SATISFACTION WITH OUTCOME OF UNGA
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DELIBERATION AND ADMITTED FRANKLY THAT SOVIETS DID NOT

FULLY UNDERSTAND WHY PYONGYANG INSISTED ON "ONE KOREA" IN UN. ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM MUST AWAIT FURTHER RIPENING, AND SOVIET HAVE FOR THE MOMENT DROPPED IDEA OF CIRCULATING A PEICE OF PAPER EMBODYING THEIR IDEAS. END SUMMARY.

2. KAPITSA RECEIVED ME AND EMBOFF ON DECEMBER 7 FOR TOUR D'HORIZON IN HIS AREA OF RESPONSIBLITY. IN PASSING, HE EXPLAINED THAT IN ADDITION TO HIS OWN DIVISION, HE SPEAKS FOR TWO OTHER ASIAN DIVISIONS IN THE MFA COLLEGIUM, OF WHICH HE IS MEMBER. HE NOTED THAT THIS BUREAUCRATIC ROLE IS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD ABROAD, AS WITNESS THE SPECULATION OVER HIS ACCOMPANYING GROMYKO TO JAPAN IN 1972.

3. CHINA: IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON PLANS FOR RETURN TO PEKING OF CHIEF BORDER NEGOTIATOR ILICHEV, KAPITSA SAID SOVIETS WOULD BE EXAMINING THE SITUATION AND WOULD DECIDE LATER. MEANWHILE, GENERAL GANKOVSKY (OF BORDER GUARDS) WAS IN CHARGE OF DELEGATION IN PEKING. KAPITSA DECLINED TO GO ALONG WIHT MY GUESS THAT ILICHEV'S RETURN WOULD DEPEND ON SOME INDICATION OF CHINESE RECEPTIVITY TO PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY SOVIETS. (AN MFA OFFICER IN KAPITSA'S DIVISION TOLD US AT SOCIAL FUNCTION DEC. 6 THAT ILICHEV WOULD REMAIN HERE AT LEAST THROUGH SUPREME SOVIET SESSION WHICH SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK.)

4. KAPITSA CONFIRMED THAT SOVIETS HAD TABLED PROPOSAL FOR BORDER RIVERS IN MARCH 1973 ALONG LINES DEVELOPED IN 1964 BORDER DISCUSSIONS. PROPOSAL BASED ON MAIN NAVIGATION CHANNEL. (ALTHOUGH KAPITSA REFERRED TO THIS CHANNEL AS THE "THALWEG," ONE OF HIS SUBORDINATES TOLD US THAT STRICLY SPEAKING THE PROPOSAL IS BASED ON THE "FARVATER," THE LATTER BEING MAIN NAVIGATION CHANNEL WHILE THE FORMER IS DEEPEST POINT IN RIVER.) CHINESE HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO REACH AGREE-MENT ON THIS BASIS, CLAIMING THAT THERE MUST FIRST BE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT INVOLVING PULL-BACK OF MILITARY FORCES FROM ALL AREAS REGARDED (BY PEKING) AS DISPUTED. CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIETS HAD CONCLUDED THAT CHINESE NEEDED EXTERNAL ENEMY FOR INTERAL PURPOSES, AND WERE INTERESTED ONLY IN KEEPING TALKS GOING, NOT IN BORDER SETTLEMENT OR ANY OTHER AGREEMENT, SUCH AS NON-AGGRESSION OR NON-USE OF FORCE. KAPITSA SAID SOVIETS HAD OFFERED PRC ALTERNATIVE OF JOINT DECLARATION RATHER THAN TREATY ON NON-AGGRESSION, BUT THIS TOO WAS REBUFFED.

5. WITH RESEPECT TO THE ISLAND OPPOSPIE KHABAROVSK, KAPITSA SAID SOVIET PROPOSAL ENVISAGED AN AGREEMENT BY WHICH BORDER WOULD BE KAZAKEVICH CHANNEL, LEAVING ISLAND IN SOVIET HANDS, BUT CHINESE WOULD BE FREELY PERMITTED TO USE MAIN NAVIGATION CHANNEL FOR SHIPPING. REFERRING TO ANNUAL NAVIGATION TALKS, KAPITSA SAID THERE WAS CONTINUOUS NEED FOR DREDGING IN AMUR AND USSURI, AND STALEMATE IN NAVIGATION TALKS MEANT RIVERS WERE SILTING UP. EVENTUALLY THEY WOULD BECOME SERIES OF LAKES, RATHER THAN RIVERS, AT LEAST FOR PURPOSES OF NAVIGATION. THIS APPARENTLY WAS WHAT CHINESE WANTED.

6. WHEN I ALLUDED TO PRESS SPECUALTION ABOUT SOVIET PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST CHINA (WHICH I HASTENED TO ADD MADE NO SENSE TO ME), KAPITSA HEARTILY AGREED AND SAID SUCH REPORTS WERE NONSENSE. "IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO OUR MORALITY EVEN TO CONTEMPLATE SUCH A THING."

7. KOREA: GIVING KAPITSA A SPRINGBOARD FOR DISCUSSION, I SAID UNGA OUTCOME ON KOREA HAD BEEN QUITE FAVORABLE THIS YEAR. SURPRISINGLY, HE CONCURRED IN HIS VIEW WITHOUT QUALIFICATIONS, MAKING NONE OF THE EXPECTED ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE UN COMMAND. HE SAID SOVIETS SUPPORTED DPRK POSITION ON "ONE KOREA" REPRESENTATION IN UN BECAUSE KOREANS WERE FRIENDS, BUT BUT FRANKLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND FULLY THE LOGIC OF PYONGYANG'S ATTITUDE. HE THOUGHTBOTH KOREAS HAD HAD UNREASONABLE EXPECTATIONS FROM THE NEW NORTH-SOUTH DIALOUGE, BUT IN SOVIET VIEW THE PROCESS OF REUNIFICATION WOULD TAKE ENORMOUS EFFORTS OVER A LONG PERIOD. SOVIETS SUPPORTED THE DIALOGUE, HOWEVER, IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING TENSIONS AND CONCOMITANT RISK OF SOVIET-US CONFRONTATION. SOVIET-NORTH KOREAN
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RELATIONS WERE NORMAL, ALTHOUGH PYONGYAND TILTED TOWARD PEKING A BIT MORE THAN HALFWAY -- PERHAPS 52-48.

8. ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY: FOLLOWING A ROUTINE EXPOSITION OF KNOWN SOVIET VIEWS ABOUT THE BREZHNEV ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SCHEME, KAPITSA CASUALLY REMARKED THAT CONDITIONS IN ASIA MIGHT TAKE QUITE SOME TIME TO BECOME RIPE FOR THIS CONCEPT -- PERHAPS FIVE YEARS, OR EVEN 20 YEARS. SOVIETS HAD INTENDED TO PRESENT A PIECE OF PAPER ON THE SUBJECT TO ASIAN GOVERNMENT, BUT HAD ABANDONED THAT IDEA FOR THE MOMENT. (THIS APPERS CONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION PASSED TO US BY RELIABLE NEWSMAN FROM EUROPEAN COMMUNIST SOURCES THAT SOVIETS ARE NOW DE-EMPHASIZING "SYSTEM" OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN FAVOR OF SERIES OF

BILATERAL ACCORDS WHICH WOULD REFER TO COLLECTIVE
SECURITY. WE NOTE BREZHNEV'S SPEECH TO INDIAN
PARLIAMENT SPEAKS OF "IDEA" RATHER THAN "SYSTEM"
OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY.)
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